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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: State Aid to Non-Public School
Children Upheld in Part- Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 24, 1977, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Wolman v. Walter' affirmed in part and reversed in part a lower
court ruling 2 which upheld the constitutionality of an Ohio statute
providing certain services to private school students at public expense. With this decision the Court further delineated the permissible limits to which a state may go in providing support for private
secondary and primary education. But in doing so the Court revealed a house divided on the method of analyzing "establishment
clause" cases and a basic conflict within the Court as to the permissible limits of state aid.
Wolman represents the farthest limits that the Supreme Court
has allowed a state to go in aiding nonpublic education. Beginning
in 1947 with Everson v. Board of Education3 the Supreme Court
upheld the reimbursement of parents for the cost of transportation
to private, non-profit schools. In 1968 the Court, in Board of Education v. Allen,4 approved the loan of textbooks to all children, including those in private schools. In 1971 the Court struck down Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania statutes which provided a subsidy for private school teachers in Lemon v. Kurtzman.' Two 1973 New York
cases, Levitt v. Committee for Public Education6 and Committee
for Public Education v. Nyquist,7 declared invalid statutes providing reimbursement for testing and scoring along with maintenance
and repair subsidies and tuition rebates. Finally, in 1975 the forerunner of the Wolman case, Meek v. Pittenger,I struck down all but
the textbook provisions of a Pennsylvania statute which provided
counseling, testing, psychological, speech, hearing, and related diagnostic and therapeutic services to nonpublic school children. The
Ohio legislature, aware of this chain of decisions and its own ten
year conflict in finding a constitutional method of aiding private
1. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
2. Wolman v. Essex, 417 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D. Ohio 1976) modified, sub nom. Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
7. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
8. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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education, responded with legislation building upon these prior
cases.
II.

FACTS

The appellants wbre citizens and taxpayers of the state of Ohio.
They brought suit in the District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio seeking to have the section of the Ohio Revised Code dealing
with state aid to private education declared unconstitutional.9 The
state legislature of Ohio had enacted four statutory schemes for the
financing of aid to private education at the primary and secondary
levels between the years 1967 and 1976. The previous three had been
declared invalid by the federal courts. 0 In response to these difficulties and the near certainty of future litigation, the legislature sought
to draft a bill which would conform to the recent Supreme Court
decision in Meek v. Pittenger." The result was Ohio Revised Code
section 3317.06 which provided twelve categories of aid to private
school pupils. These were: 1) textbooks; 2) instructional materials;
3) instructional equipment; 4) speech and hearing diagnostic services; 5) medical and dental services; 6) diagnostic psychological
services; 7) therapeutic psychological, speech and hearing services;
8) guidance and counseling services; 9) remedial services; 10) standardized tests and scoring services; 11) programs for handicapped
children; and 12) bus transportation for field trips. 2 Appellants
challenged all categories except the medical and dental services as
being violative of the first amendment. A three-judge panel on the
district court level found the statute to be wholly constitutional. 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
III.

DECISION OF THE COURT

Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, structured his
opinion into eight major parts. Part one of the opinion was essentially a discussion of the factual background, including the stipulation that, of the 720 schools privately chartered in Ohio, all but
twenty-nine were sectarian and 92% were run by the Catholic
Church.
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (A)-(D), (F)-(L) (Page Supp. 1976).
10. Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 808 (1972);
Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413
U.S. 901 (1973); Wolman v. Essex, 421 U.S. 982 (1975).
11. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
12. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976).
13. Wolman v. Essex, 417 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D. Ohio 1976), modified sub nom. Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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Part two of the opinion sets forth the mode of analysis used by
the Court. The Court adopts the three-pronged test first utilized in
Lemon v. Kurtzman 4 to analyze "establishment clause" cases.
Lemon held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute authorizing
part payment by the state of teachers' salaries in parochial schools.
The test in the Wolman Court's words requires that, "In order to
pass muster, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, must
have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, and must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion."" The majority found upon application of this threepronged test that the difficulty lies not with the requirement that
the legislation have a secular purpose, but with the latter two requirements of effect and entanglement.
The third part of the opinion deals with part (A) of the statute 16
which authorizes secular textbooks for loan to nonpublic school students. The Court refers to the factual similarity between Ohio's
textbook loan program and that found in Board of Education v.
Alien 7 and in Meek v. Pittenger.5 The Court states that: "As read,
the statute provides the same protection against abuse as were provided in the textbook programs under consideration in Allen and
Meek."' 9 Therefore relying on past decisions the Court upheld this
provision of the statute.
20
Part four of the opinion deals with section (J) of the statute
providing standardized tests and scoring services for nonpublic
schools. The Court contrasts the Ohio provision with that discussed
in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education2' where a New York
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
16. OfI-o REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(A) (Page Supp. 1976) provides:
To purchase such secular textbooks as have been approved by the superintendent of
public instruction for use in public schools in the state and to loan such textbooks to
pupils attending nonpublic schools within the district or to their parents. Such loans
shall be based upon individual requests submitted by such non-public school pupils
or parents. Such requests shall be submitted to the local public school district in which
the nonpublic school is located. Such individual requests for the loan of textbooks
shall, for administrative convenience, be submitted by the nonpublic school pupil or
his parent to the nonpublic school which shall prepare and submit collective summaries of the individual requests to the local public school district. As used in this section,
"textbook" means any book or book substitute which a pupil uses as a text or text
substitute in a particular class or program in the school he regularly attends.
17. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
18. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
19. 433 U.S. 229, 238 (1977).
20. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(J) (Page Supp. 1976) provides: "To supply for use
by pupils attending nonpublic schools within the district such standardized tests and scoring
services as are in use in the public schools of the state."
21. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
14.
15.
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statute provided for the reimbursement of church sponsored schools
for the cost of teacher-prepared testings. The majority found that,
unlike the situation in Levitt, the Ohio nonpublic schools would not
control the content of the tests and as such they could not be converted to religious teaching. This avoids the "direct aid to religion
found present in Levitt. Similarly, the inability of the school to
control the test eliminates the need for supervision that gives rise
to excessive entanglement." 2 Therefore the Court upheld this provision.
Part five of the opinion deals with sections (D) and (F) of the
statute which provides for psychological, speech and hearing diagnostic services for nonpublic school pupils. 23 The Court cited the
fact that the appellants did not even challenge section (E) of the
statute which provided for medical and dental services and drew
attention to the close similarity between the two types of services.
The Court went on to find that previous decisions have "a common
thread to the effect that the provision of health services to all school
children, public and nonpublic, does not have the primary effect of
aiding religion." 4 Citing greater safeguards than in Meek, which
struck down speech and hearing diagnostic services, the Court concluded that there was no need for excessive surveillance, no extreme
risk of fostering ideological views and therefore no excessive entanglement. Consequently, the Court upheld this provision.
Part six of the opinion deals with sections (G), (H), (I), and (K)
of the statute which provide funding for certain therapeutic, guidance and remedial services for students who have been identified as
needing specialized treatment.a The statute further required that
22. 433 U.S. 229, 240 (1977).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(D, F) (Page Supp. 1976) provides:

23.

(D). To provide speech and hearing diagnostic services to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the district. Such service shall be provided in the nonpublic
school attended by the pupil receiving the service.
(F). To provide diagnostic psychological services to pupils attending nonpublic
schools within the district. Such services shall be provided in the school attended by
the pupil receiving the service.
24. 433 U.S. 229, 242 (1977).
25. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (G,H,I,K) (Page Supp. 1976) provides:
(G). To provide therapeutic psychological and speech and hearing services to
pupils attending nonpublic schools within the district. Such services shall be provided
in the public school, in public centers, or in mobile units located off the nonpublic
premises as determined by the state department of education. If such services are
provided in the public school or in public centers transportation to and from such
facilities shall be provided by the public school district in which the nonpublic school
is located.
(H). To provide guidance and counseling services to pupils attending nonpublic
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this treatment could not be given on the nonpublic school premises.
The Court singled out the appellant's contention that because these
services might be provided apart from public school students, those
personnel providing the services might be drawn into an ideological
approach by the mere fact of this separation. The Court rejected
this argument stating, "So long as these types of services are offered
at truly religiously neutral locations, the danger perceived need not
arise." 2 The Court saw no excessive entanglement arising from supervision of the personnel, as supervision of public employees on
public property is hardly an entanglement between church and
state. The neutral site ensured that religion would not be advanced
by these services.
Part seven of the opinion deals with sections (B) and (C) of the
statute, which provide instructional materials and equipment for
loan to nonpublic school pupils. 7 As the Court in Meek had found
a similar provision to be unconstitutional, the appellees attempted
to distinguish the Ohio program by pointing to the requirement that
the equipment go directly to the student, unlike the direct loan to
schools within the district. Such services shall be provided in the public school, in
public centers, or in mobile units located off of the nonpublic premises as determined
by the state department of education. If such services are provided in the public school
or in public center, transportation to and from such facilities shall be provided by the
public school district in which the nonpublic is located.
(I). To provide remedial services to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the
district. Such services shall be provided in the public school, in public centers, or in
mobile units located off of the nonpublic premises as determined by the state department of education. If such services are provided in the public school or in public
centers, transportation to and from such facilities shall be provided by the public
school district in which the nonpublic school is located.
(K). To provide programs for the deaf, blind, emotionally disturbed, crippled, and
physically handicapped children attending nonpublic schools within the district. Such
services shall be provided in the public school, in public centers, or in mobile units
located off of the nonpublic premises as determined by the state department of education. If such services are provided in the public school, or in public centers, transportation to and from such facilities shall be provided by the public school district in which
the nonpublic school is located.
26. 433 U.S. 229, 247 (1977).
27. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(B & C) (Page Supp. 1976) provides:
(B). To purchase and to loan to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the
district or to their parents upon individual request, such secular, neutral and nonideological instructional materials as are in use in the public schools within the district
and which are incapable of diversion to religious use and to hire clerical personnel to
administer such lending program.
(C). To purchase and to loan to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the
district or to their parents, upon individual request, such secular, neutral and nonideological instructional equipment as is in use in the public school within the district and
which is incapable of diversion to religious use and to hire clerical personnel to administer such lending program.
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the private schools found in Meek. The Court rejected this distinction, stating that the providing of instructional equipment to nonpublic schools "inescapably had the primary effect of providing a
direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise."2
Therefore, as in Meek, the providing of such aid was held unconsitutional.
The final section of the opinion, part eight, deals with section
(L) of the statute which authorized the funding of transportation of
nonpublic school field trips.29 The Court found that because the
nonpublic school controls the timing, frequency, and, subject to
some limitations, the destinations of these trips, it was the beneficial recipient and not the pupils. This, in the Court's view, amounts
to "impermissible direct aid to sectarian education."3 Further, to
ensure secular use of field trip funds and transportation would require such a high degree of supervision as would create excessive
entanglement. For this reason, the Court found that section (E) was
unconstitutional.
The eight points of the opinion were marked by a large number
of dissenting votes. Of the sixty-four votes cast, some eighteen were
dissents, with the remaining forty-six comprising the majority." As
a result, separate opinions were written by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens.2
Justice Brennan in his separate opinion stated that "ingenuity
in draftsmanship cannot obscure the fact that this subsidy to sectarian schools amounts to $88,800,888. '' 3 Because of this, he concluded
28. 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977).
29. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(L) (Page Supp. 1976) provides: "To provide such
field trip transportation and services to nonpublic school students as are provided to public
school students in the district. School districts may contract with commercial transportation
companies for such transportation service if school district busses are unavailable."
30. 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977).
31. The concurrence and dissent breakdown for the eight points was as follows: part 1,
Justices Blackmun, Stewart, Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens concurring;
part 2, Justices Burger, Stewart and Powell concurring, Justices Brennan and Stevens dissenting; part 3, Justices Burger, Stewart, Powell, White and Rehnquist concurring, Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissenting; part 4, Justices Burger, Stewart, Powell, White
and Rehnquist concurring, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissenting; part 5, Justices Blackmun, Stewart, Burger, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, White and Rehnquist concurring, Justice Brennan dissenting; part 6, Justices Blackmun, Stewart, Burger, Powell, Stevens, White and Rehnquist concurring, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting; part 7,
Justices Blackmun, Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Powell (with reservations)
concurring, Justices Burger, White and Rehnquist dissenting; part 8, Justices Blackmun,
Stewart, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens concurring, Justices Burger, White, Rehnquist and
Powell dissenting.
32. Chief Justice Burger dissented from parts VII and VIII of the opinion. Justices
White and Rehnquist concur in parts III,
IV, V, and VI and dissent in parts VII and VIII.
33. 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977) (Brennan, J. concurring and dissenting).
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that "[t]his suffices without more to require the conclusion that
the Ohio statute in its entirety offends the First Amendment's pro34
hibition against laws respecting an 'establishment of religion'."
Justice Marshall's approach would be to overrule Board of Education v. Allen 35 because he believes "that Allen is largely responsible for reducing the 'high and impregnable' wall between church
and state".36 He suggests this would draw the line at allowing general welfare programs for children while prohibiting programs of
educational assistance.
Justice Powell in his opinion finds fault only with points seven
and eight. He believes that while the Ohio statute provides for an
unconstitutional method of loaning instructional materials and
equipment, he is unwilling to adopt the majority conclusion that all
schemes of loaning such equipment are by their nature improper.
He dissents from part eight, finding that the Ohio field trip provision is indistinguishable from that approved in Everson v. Board of
37
Of the separate opinions it is Justice Powell who is
Education.
most supportive of the aims of the Ohio legislature.
The opinion by Justice Stevens advocated the abandonment of
the three-pronged Lemon test, for a much stricter test patterned
after Justice Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education,
which found that, "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
38
levied to support any religious activities or institutions. ' Under
this test any state subsidy with the possible exception of those directly relating to public health services would be invalid. Justices
Burger, White and Rehnquist recorded their dissents without comment.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Wolman found constitutional most of the very same services
struck down in Meek v. Pittenger.39 With the Court utilizing the
40
same three-pronged test in both cases the result seems remarkable.
The answer lies in the careful draftsmanship by the Ohio legislature. One of the prime objections in Meek, was that the stateprovided services were on the private school premises and were sub34. 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977) (Brennan, J. concurring and dissenting).
35. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
36. 433 U.S. 229, 257 (1977) (Marshall, J. concurring and dissenting).
37. 330 U.S. 1(1947).
38. 433 U.S. 229, 265 (1977), citing Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1 at 16 (1947)
(Stevens, J. concurring and dissenting).
39. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
40. While the Court had lost Justice Douglas and gained Justice Stevens, their votes
would not have affected the outcome as the position taken was similar.
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ject to some limited control by the private school administrators.
The Ohio statute, by contrast, was directed at providing those same
services at off-campus sites, which ranged from mobile centers to
public buildings. Further, the loan of textbooks and the unsuccessful attempt at the loan of materials were subject to strict limitations. The field trip transportation, while subject to some limitations, appears to have fallen short of the standard set by the Court.
The reason for this failure may have been that unlike the other types
of aid, field trip transportation was an area not yet dealt with by
the Court.
At first glance Wolman appears to have strengthened the
Lemon three-pronged test. But a close examination of the voting
breakdown on point two, which adopts the test, reveals that this
method was supported by only Justices Burger, Stewart, and Powell, while Justices Brennan and Stevens dissented. A majority of
three may well indicate that the search for a better mode of
analysis might be underway. Of the two dissenters, Justice Stevens
offered an alternate test and Justice Marshall, who did not dissent
completely, expressed his displeasure with the continuance of the
present test. The ultimate question may well be what effect the
abandonment of the three-pronged Lemon test would have on situations such as presented in Wolman and in Meek. An examination
of two of the opinion points, which did not deal with the public
health question, 4' points three and four dealing with textbooks and
testing, show that the support generated for these services resulted
in a five to three for vote. This indicates limited support for textbooks and testing even though a favorable textbook ruling extends
back almost ten years.2
The national significance of Wolman may well be that, through
careful drafting in conformance with the Court's opinion, states
may expand their realm of state aid to private school pupils without
fear of a successful court challenge. The negative effect brought
home by an examinatination of the voting breakdown is that the
permissible limits under the Lemon three-pronged analysis may
have been reached. Any future Court action, may prove that only a
limited expansion beyond Wolman is possible.
41. Public health issues are considered to be an exception, while those services not of a
health related nature are viewed with a more rigorous eye. In this case OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3317.06(E) (Page Supp. 1976) was not even challenged. Section E reads as follows: "To
provide physician, nursing, dental, and optometric services to pupils attending nonpublic
schools within the district. Such services shall be provided in the school attended by the
nonpublic school pupil receiving the service." For further clarification see Justice Stevens'
dissent.
42. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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Five Ohio statutes which had provided state aid to nonpublic
school children and schools have undergone court tests since 1969.11
As a result the Ohio legislature has four times revised or rewritten
statutes which were held unconstitutional." The most recent legislative enactment was contested here.15 This persistence appears to
have provided a "suit safe method of private school pupil aid appropriation, thus ending a ten year legislative search. 6
V.

CONCLUSION

Wolman provides the legislator and his draftsman with the
clearest and most expansive delineation of what aid to private secondary and primary schools is permissible under the "establishment
clause" of the First Amendment. It reinforces a chain of cases that
have gradually revealed the amount and method of aid possible
under the Constitution. With the reaffirmation of the Lemon threepronged test, it provides those courts, confronted with cases of this
type, a mode of analysis that is backed by adequate precedent.
At the same time, Wolman can be viewed as a limiting factor
because, due to the nature of the test it utilizes and the multiple
cases that the Court has examined, it should have provided enough
of a base that the issue will not come before the Supreme Court for
some time. However, some possibility for change can be envisioned
because of the disparate voting patterns found in Wolman. These
patterns indicate that there is a basic disagreement, not just as to
the limits of aid, but also as to the mode of analysis itself. It would
appear that any significant change in this area will only occur with
a change in the make-up of the Court. Until that time, Wolman
should stand as the guide in delineating permissible public aid to
private schools.
David Allen Barnette
43. Wolman v. Essex, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.
Ohio 1972), aff'd sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F.
Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd 409 U.S. 808 (1972); Protestants & Other Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State v. Essex, 28 Ohio St. 2d 79, 275 N.E.2d 603 (1971).
44. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1969) (act in effect 1967 to 1969); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.062 (Page 1972) (act in effect 1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5703.052,
5747.05, 5747.111 (Page 1973) (act in effect 1972); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.062 (Page
1972) (act in effect 1973, repealed 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976)
(act in effect 1976).
45. S. 170, Ohio Gen. Ass., 112th Sess. (1975).
46. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1969) (passed in 1967).

Published by eCommons, 1978

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss2/13

